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of discord. The recent mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX Act” or “SOX”), and the Security and
Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) implementing regulations continue to increase the disclosure obligations of
public companies. This article examines the implementation of code of ethics requirements under SOX. It
examines the SEC’s regulations, which implement SOX requirements on the disclosure of codes of ethics, and
self-regulatory agency (“SRO” or “listing agency”) rules on codes of ethics for public companies. This article
argues that code of ethics rules encroach into state law in defining the fiduciary obligations of officers and
directors. Specifically, this article argues that the SEC’s approval of New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and
National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD” or “Nasdaq”) rules allow the SEC to do indirectly what it
could not do directly. This article, therefore, calls for an amendment to the SEC’s code of ethics implementing
regulation to provide a safe-harbor for senior financial officers and principal executive officers.
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INTRODUCTION

The important function of disclosure under federal securities laws and
regulations, and the role of management in running the affairs of the corporation
consistent with state fiduciary principles have a history of discord.1 The recent
mandates of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX Act" or "SOX"), and the Security and
Exchange Commission's ("SEC") implementing regulations continue to increase
the disclosure obligations of public companies. 2 These disclosure obligations
include more in-depth financial reports, certification of financial reports3 by senior
executives, financial experts on the audit committee, and codes of ethics.
The post SOX regulatory environment furthers the tension between federal
securities, and state corporate law.4 This article examines the implementation of
code of ethics requirements under SOX. It examines the SEC's regulations, which
implement SOX requirements on the disclosure of codes of ethics, and selfregulatory agency ("SRO" or "listing agency") rules on codes of ethics for public
companies. 5 This article argues that code of ethics rules encroach into state law in

1 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate
Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573 (2005); Richard A. Booth, The Emerging Conflict between Federal
Securities Law and State CorporationLaw, 12 J. CORP. L. 73 (1986); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism
and the Corporation:The DesirableLimits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1437 (1992); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1793 (2006); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium
Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619 (2006); Renee Jones, Does
Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 879, 880 (2006); see generally Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the MaterialityStandard in the
Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317 (2007); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's
Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2521 (2005).
2 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7261-66 (2002); see Steven A. Ramirez, The End
of CorporateGovernance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structuresfor a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON
REG. 313 (2007); Peter Ferola, The Role of Audit Committee in the Wake of Corporate Federalism:
Sarbanes-Oxley's Creep into State CorporateLaw, 71 J. Bus. & SEC L. 143 (2007); Robert Ahdieh,
From Federalizationto Mixed Governance in CorporateLaw: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF.
L. REV. 721 (2005); Thomas 0. Gorman & Heather J. Stewart, Is there a New Sheriff in
Corporateville? The Obligations of Directors, Officers, Accountants, and Lawyers after SarbanesOxley of 2002, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 135 (2004); E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate
Governance and the ProfessionalResponsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441 (2003); David J.
Schulte, The Debatable Casefor Securities Disclosure Regulation, 13 J. CORP. L. 535 (1988).
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 2.
4 See Veasey, supra note 2, at 443; Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The
Standard of Care and the Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYo. L. REV. 481, 483-84 (2006);
Ramirez, supra note 2, at 321; Ferola, supra note 2, at 147-149; see Schulte, supra note 2, at 536-38,
547; see Gorman & Stewart, supra note 2 at 140 (arguing that corporate managers must currently
adhere to a series of federal laws that were more typically found in state corporate law); see Ahdieh,
supra note 2, at 721, 725-26, 728-729 (stating that the most universal criticism of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act is for its "federalization" of corporate law by delegation of rule-making authority to the SEC and
the disconnect between the Act's supposed ends and means).
5 See, e.g., § 406; 15 U.S.C. § 7264; 17 CFR pt. 228-29, 249; 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(I); 17 C.F.R. § 240;
19b-4; see also NYSE 303A.10, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, http://www.nyse.com/
Frameset.html?nyseref- http%3A//www.nyse.conmregulationlisted/l 101074746736.html&displayPage
=lcm/lcm_subsection.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2007); Nasdaq Rules, http://www.nasdaq.com/ about/
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defining the fiduciary obligations of officers and directors.
Specifically, this article argues that the SEC's approval of New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD" or
"Nasdaq") rules allow the SEC to do indirectly what it could not do directly. 6 The
SEC has approved quasi-federal corporate governance rules that contravene the
internal affairs doctrine, move closer to development of federal common law for
corporate conduct, and supplant state corporate law by defining fiduciary duties of
officers and directors.7 The NYSE and Nasdaq rules require a listed public
company develop a code of ethics that, among other things, prohibits the taking of
corporate opportunities and conflicts of interest. These rules not only regulate the
conduct of officers and directors in meeting their fiduciary obligations to the
corporation and shareholders, but also8 redefine the meaning of fiduciary duties
under state law, in particular Delaware.
This article, therefore, calls for an amendment to the SEC's code of ethics
CorpGovSummary.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
6

See http://www.nasdaq.com/about/2008-Corporate_.FS.pdf (Nasdaq is the listing agency and the

operating subsidiary of the National Association of Securities Dealers "NASD".The SEC's obligations
under § 19(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act are to approve self-regulatory agency rules.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §19(b), 15 USC §78 S(b)(2). For a history of SROs, including the
New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq see http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-50700.htm (last
visited Sept. 19, 2007) (17 CFR pt. 240, Release No. 34-50700, Concept Release Concerning SelfRegulation); see American Bar Association, Report, Special Study On Market Structure, Listing
Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1497-1503, 1530-33 (discussing the history
of NYSE and Nasdaq. In 1817, twenty-seven brokers organized themselves as the New York Stock
Exchange Board, later renamed NYSE. The NYSE initially did not use listing standards to determine
which stock to list. Prior to the twentieth century, each issuer and the NYSE negotiated flexible listing
agreements. In the absence of uniform listing standards, the NYSE's Board of Governor's formed a
Committee on Stock List to evaluate applications of issuers to list securities on the NYSE. Written
corporate governance standards were not promulgated until thirty years later when the NYSE began
securing agreements in writing and requiring disclosure of financial information. Then, through out the
NYSE's development, the requirements in listing agreements became more numerous and stringent,
such as, requiring companies to produce annual reports to stockholders, requiring annual stockholder's
meetings, notifying NYSE of any change in the rights of stockholders or of "redemption of preferred
stock," disclosure of semiannual income statement and balance sheets, quarterly income disclosures,
etc. During the 1970s the NYSE was renowned as the most prestigious exchange, imposing the most
stringent listing standards to attract some of the largest commercial and industrial companies in the
United States. NYSE's trading volume was growing exponentially to about 16 million shares each day
which was almost four times the volume in previous decades. In 2001, NYSE reported listing almost
3,000 companies and its daily volume exceeded a billion shares. The predecessor to Nasdaq was
formed in 1971 by the NASD to improve the efficiency of OTC unlisted securities. Historically Nasdaq
did not list securities but operated as a quotation service operated by a "registered securities
Until the 1980s, Nasdaq
association" rather than a registered "national securities exchange."
unsuccessfully sought federal preemption of state blue sky laws in order to compete with NYSE and
Amex who were dominating the U.S. securities market since the 1970s. One of the requirements of
obtaining preemption was establishing listing requirements. In 1985, Nasdaq established its first
corporate governance listing standards, such as requiring submission of annual and periodic reports to
shareholders, appointment of directors, independent auditors, shareholder participation in some
corporate transactions and execution of listing agreements. See American Bar Association, Report,
Special Study On Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487,
1497-1503, 1530-33. See also Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing
Standards under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW. 1461, 1476-79 (1992).
7 See generally American Bar Association, supra note 6, at 1525-28; see Bainbridge, infra note 66;
see Bainbridge, infra note 88, at 591; see Thompson, infra note, at 1181-82.
8 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revisiting the One Share/One Vote Controversy: The Exchange's
Uniform Voting Rights Policy, 22 SEC. REG. L. J. 175 (1994) (discussing limits of listing agency rules).
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implementing regulation to provide a safe-harbor for senior financial officers and
principal executive officers. A safe-harbor provision should not only clarify that
regulation 406 is for disclosure, but also that any substantive benchmarks
for
9
conduct required by listing agency rules do not supplant state fiduciary law.
Part one of this article overviews SOX section 406, the SEC's regulation
implementing section 406, and the NYSE and Nasdaq rules on codes of ethics. In
particular, part one examines the legislative history of SOX section 406, and the
interplay of SEC regulations and listing agency rules.
Part two briefly overviews the internal affairs doctrine. Part two also
examines rulemaking boundaries of the SEC in approving amendments to SRO
rules, and revisits the Business Roundtable decision. Further, part two compares
the legal environment leading to passage of SOX to the banking crisis of the
1980s, and examines the cases on federal common law.
Part three then focuses on the doctrine of corporate opportunity and conflicts
of interest in Delaware. This part demonstrates that listing agency rules are
inconsistent with Delaware's interpretation of conflicts of interest and corporate
opportunity.
This article concludes arguing in support of a safe-harbor provision in the
SEC's section 406 regulation. This final part explains the risks to state fiduciary
law by using listing agency standards to define the obligations of officers and
directors to shareholders, and the corporation. Additionally, this article points out
the urgency to public companies, which may risk de-listing by NYSE and Nasdaq

9 See Veasey, supra note 2, at 443-44 (discussing the ways SRO and SOX intrude into Delaware
law. Federal securities laws were initially promulgated to regulate the market in the area of disclosure.
Delaware law has been a "default repository" for the development and depth of the law regarding
fiduciary duties of directors and officers in the wake of emerging federal statutory duties and SEC
Rules that may trump Delaware law. Although the SOX and SRO's reach into the internal affairs of
Delaware corporations is substantial they have not entirely supplanted Delaware law. For example,
SOX and SRO regulation have preempted or occupied internal affairs regarding the composition of
board of directors, composition of audit, compensation, and governance committees, some activities
and requirements of boards and committees, defining details regarding independence of directors,
reporting and certification requirements of CEO's and the CFO, prohibitions, such as consulting fees
and loans to officers); see American Bar Association, supra note 6, at 1493-96 (recommending
nonbinding listing standard best practices "pertaining to the integrity of the securities markets and
fairness to investors." Some of the best practice guidelines were to follow general principles. For
example, best practices guidelines should be nonbinding and limited to issues of corporate governance
necessary and "directly relevant" to maintenance of the integrity of the market and fairness to investors,
allow for differences among issuers, where appropriate, considering size and other factors; joint action
by NYSE and Nasdaq to create best practice guidelines to be updated and reviewed frequently through
a protocol including publication, public comment; and active participation of the SEC, investors,
issuers, firms, academics; joint establishment by NYSE and Nasdaq of processes to ensure uniform
application and interpretation of best practice guidelines; written interpretations of guidelines, public
availability of guidelines, issuance of rules and orders under section I IA of the Exchange Act
authorizing a plan for joint action; requiring disclosure by each listed company in periodic reports,
proxy materials, other public files regarding compliance with best practice guidelines; requiring
explanation for noncompliance, and requiring disclosure of material changes to issuer's practices in an
interim filing. American Bar Association, supra note 6, at 1493-96.).
' Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia unanimously vacated Rule 19c-4, holding that the rule directly regulated the distribution of
powers among classes of shareholders-a matter of internal corporate governance-and that the SEC
overreached the scope of its statutory authority delegated by Congress in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Act).
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in the event a company adopts a code of ethics that satisfies state fiduciary
obligations for corporate opportunities or conflicts of interest, but does not comply
with listing agency rules.

II.
A.

CODE OF ETHICS REQUIREMENTS

Codes of Ethics Pre - SOXAct

Company codes of ethics or conduct are not recent developments. Before
the enactment of SOX, many companies had codes of ethics. I I Companies
adopted codes of ethics in order to satisfy certain requirements of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and equal employment laws. 12 In addition, companies also13
adopted business ethics procedures to encourage an ethical work environment.
Often these codes of ethics ranged from values to compliance focused. 14 Such
corporate codes covered a wide range of topics designed to promote employee
honesty and integrity. 15 The SOX Act has required the disclosure of codes of
ethics in ways not previously required by mandating disclosure of codes of ethics,
if adopted, accountability procedures, and benchmarks for honest and ethical
conduct. 16

1 See Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market for
Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 254 (2005); see generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational
Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 591-93 (2005) (discussing
types of corporate compliance codes).
12 See Craig Ehrlich, Is Business Ethics Necessary?, 4 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L. J. 55, 58 (2005);
LINDA KLEBE TREVINO & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A
SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVE ON BUSINESS ETHICS 78 (Stanford University Press 2003).
13 See Saul W. Gellerman, Why "Good" Managers Make Bad Ethical Choices, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Jul.-Aug. 1986, at 85 (arguing that more objective and more frequent control mechanisms are effective
ways to avoid unethical management conduct and that there are four rationalizations used by managers
to justify questionable conduct: first, there is a belief that the conduct is not "really" illegal or immoral;
second, there is a belief that the conduct is in the best interest of the corporation or the individual; third,
there is a belief that the conduct is "safe" and will not be exposed; and finally there is belief that since
the conduct is beneficial to the company, the company will condone it).
14 See Krawiec, supra note I1, at 591-98 (discussing types of corporate compliance codes); see
generally TREVINO & WEAVER, supra note 12, at 91 (attempting to relate studies of ethics to larger
normative questions of what ought to be valued. Values and ethics are communicated by the members
of an organization similar to the way they conduct themselves, the manners in which they discuss
matters regarding the organization and the manners in which they deal with outsiders. Perhaps, it is not
surprising that organizational members tend to be less ethical in their decision-making if they perceive
unfairness or injustice. From a subordinate's perspective, leaders carry out their agendas, incorporate
their ethics into everyday operations of the company, and care about their employees will make more
ethical decisions. TREVINO & WEAVER, supra note 12, at 91.); see STEVEN R. BARTH, CORPORATE
ETHICS: THE BUSINESS CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ETHICAL EMPLOYEES 19-20 (Aspatore Books 2003).
15See TREVINO & WEAVER, supra note 12, at 91; LYNNE L. DALLAS, ENRON AND ETHICAL
CORPORATE CLIMATES, ENRON CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 187-207 (Nancy B.
Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan, 2004) (discussing components of ethical decision-making).
16 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE SECTOR WATCHDOGS (Comm. Print 2002).
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The SOXAct - Code of Ethics

Section 406 of SOX requires the SEC promulgate regulations requiring a
corporation to disclose whether it has a code of ethics for senior financial officers
and if it does not the reasons for not adopting a code of ethics. 17 Section 406 of
SOX does not require a company adopt a code of ethics; however, it does require
the SEC to issue regulations requiring
immediate disclosure of changes to or
18
waivers of an adopted code of ethics.
The SOX Act limited the applicability of the code of ethics to senior
financial officers, principal financial officers, comptroller or principal accounting
officers or those performing similar functions. 19 The SOX Act defines code of
ethics to include standards promoting reasonable honest, ethical conduct and
handling of conflicts of
interest, timely and accurate filing of periodic reports, and
20
laws.
with
compliance
C. Legislative Background
Congress passed the SOX Act amid turmoil and crisis in the public
disclosure of financial fraud.
During many Congressional hearings, it became
clear that transparency and independence would be the focus of legislation. 22 The
legislative history of section 406 indicates the code of ethics provisions came at the
recommendation of Senator Corzine.23 Senator Corzine attributed a need for
investors to know whether a public company held its24officers to ethical standards
to prevent corporate failures such as Enron and others.
Other members of Congress recommended that the SEC develop rules to
inform investors not only of coTorate ethical standards, but also if the board
waived any ethical requirements.
There is nothing in the legislative history on
section 406 to suggest that Congress intended anything more than disclosure

17 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (2006).
18 Id.
19 Id.

20
2'

Id. at § 406(C).
See President Bush's comments on corporate governance,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/corporateresponsibility/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2007); WILLIAM H.
DONALDSON,

SPEECH

BY SEC

CHAIRMAN:

REMARKS

AT THE 2003

WASHINGTON

ECONOMIC

http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch032403whd.htm (last visited September 19, 2007);
see also The Business Roundtable statement, ENOUGH IS ENOUGH,
http://www.businessroundtable.org//taskForces/taskforce/document.aspx?qs=6AE5BF 59F9495144811
38A6DF91851159169FEB5693FB5 (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
CONFERENCE,

22 See also JOHN T. BOSTELMAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESKBOOK, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,

§12:1. 1, p. 12-7 (Practising Law Institute 2004) (discussing legislatively history of SOX).
23 See Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Public Company Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Report to Accompany S. 2673 Together with Additional
Views, S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 32 (2002).
24 Id.
25 See H.R. 3763-The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act
of 2002: Hearings on H.R. 3763 Before The Committee on H. R., 107th Cong., 131 (2002).
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26
obligations for codes of ethics.
Congress viewed a need for ethical accountability and disclosure as
necessary in light of testimony revealing that the Enron board often waived its
code of ethics requirements in order to engage in certain fraudulent financial
transactions. 27 Many argued knowledge of such waivers would
have allowed
28
investors to see the broader financial picture and spot red flags.

D. SEC's Implementing Regulation and CorporateGovernance Mandates
Effective in March 2003, the SEC issued its final rule implementing SOX
section 406 code of ethics disclosure requirements.29 Later in 2003, the SEC also
approved amendments to the NYSE and Nasdaq rules on corporate
governance
30
that included code of ethics requirements for listed companies.
The rules, approved by the SEC, and adopted by the NYSE and Nasdaq,
mandate listed companies adopt a code of ethics and disclose the code and any
waivers. 31 The SEC's regulations do not require a company have a code of ethics,
but disclose whether it has one or explain why it does not. 32 Optional versus
mandatory adoption of a code of ethics is one of several ways that the regulations
and rules differ.

E. SEC's Section 406
Unlike other SEC SOX regulations, which mandate additional substantive
compliance with securities laws, section 406 requires only disclosure or waiver of
a code of ethics.33 Consistent with SOX, the SEC did not require a company to
have a code of ethics, but to disclose whether it has one or explain why it does
not.34 If a company has a code of ethics, the regulations set forth broad parameters
for what should be included in a code of ethics and does not require specific

26

See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies:
h

HearingsBefore the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107t Cong. (2002) (statement

of Honorable David S. Ruder, former Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n) (stating the internal
affairs of the corporation are not subject to SEC direct intervention); see also Joshua A. Newberg,
Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market For Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L.
REV. 253, 272-76 (2005) (discussing legislative history of SOX section 406).
27 See Newberg, supra note 26, at 272.
28 See Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Public Company Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, supra note 23.
29 See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17 C.F.R.
§ 228, 229, 249 (2006).
30 See Self-Regulatory Organizations, 60 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Sec. and Exch. Comm'n Nov. 12,
2003) (order approving proposed rule changes); see also Commissioner Pitt's Press Release,
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-23.txt (last visited Sept. 19, 2007).
31 Id.
32

Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 29.

33 Id. at 5110; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (2006).
34 Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 29,
at 5110, 5118.
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language, compliance procedures or disciplinary measures. 35 The SEC expanded
its final rule to include not only senior financial officers, but also the principal
executive36 officer even though SOX limited its scope to certain senior financial
officers.
Although the SEC's section 406 regulation permits companies to define their
own code of ethics standards, procedures for internal reporting, and accountability
for code compliance, the SEC recommends that a code of ethics include written
standards "reasonably designed to deter wrong doing." 37 The regulation requires
the code of ethics cover parameters consistent with SOX. These are honest and
ethical behavior, including handling of conflicts of interest; fair, accurate, and
timely filing of disclosure reports; compliance with applicable laws, rules and
regulations; internal procedures for reporting and accountability for violations of
the code ethics. 38 The SEC did not require the
39 code of ethics include specific
language that officers avoid conflicts of interest.
Companies may select from several alternatives to disclose the code of ethics
including website postings, and must disclose any waivers from compliance with
its code of ethics immediately.40 Companies may also have separate codes of
ethics for different officers. 4 1 The SEC defines a waiver or implicit waiver as a
material departure or failure to prevent a material departure from a provision of the
code of ethics. 42 Also implicit in this requirement is that the board must approve
any waivers to the code of ethics.43
F. NYSE and Nasdaq Requirements
Unlike the SEC's regulation that did not require adoption of a code of ethics,
the SEC approved NYSE and Nasdaq rule changes that require listed companies to
adopt a code of ethics. 44 The SEC commented that requiring companies listed on
the NYSE or Nasdaq adopt code of ethics encouraged ethical conduct and,
therefore, provided investors with information to evaluate and assess compliance

35 Id.
36 Id. at 5118 (Code of Ethics final rule B(l)(a)). Although the SEC received comments suggesting
it not extend the requirement to the principal executive officer, the SEC ultimately decided that it was

proper to extend the requirements to the principal executive officer because it was appropriate to expect
financial officers reporting to the chief executive to hold the principal executive officer to the same
standards. Id.
37 id.
31 Id. at 5118, n. 43.
39 Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra, note 29,
at 5118.
4 Id. at 5119, n. 53. The SEC requires that only "only amendments or waivers relating to the
specified elements of the code of ethics and the specified officers must be disclosed." Id.
41 Iad. at 5118, n. 46, 5126, 5130-3 1
42 Id. at 5119, 5131; see also BOSTELMAN, supra note 22, at Chapter 12.
43 Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra, note 29,
at 5119; see also BOSTELMAN, supranote 22, at Chapter 12
44 See Self-Regulatory Organizations, 60 Fed. Reg. 64, 154 (Sec. and Exch. Comm'n Nov. 12,
2003) (order approving proposed rule changes).
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with the code of ethics.
G. NYSE Rules

The NYSE rules require a company listed on its exchange adopt and disclose
its code of ethics, and any waivers of the code of ethics. 46 The NYSE requires the
code of ethics apply to directors, officers, and employees and4 7is not only broader in
application than the SEC's regulation, but also the SOX Act.
The NYSE listing company rules further differs from the SEC regulations
and requires the code of ethics address the following: conflicts of interest,
corporate opportunities, confidentiality, fair dealing, protection and proper use of
company assets, compliance with laws, rules and regulations, encouraging the
reporting of any illegal or unethical behavior.48 While a listed company may
define its own policies, the more significant of these requirements are conflicts of
interest and corporate opportunities.
The NYSE rules define a conflict of interest as a personal interest that
interferes with the interests of the company. 49 Companies must have policies to
prohibit conflicts of interest and provide a means to report such conflicts of
interest. 50 Prompt disclosure of waivers by the board is required.5 The NYSE
rules define a corporate opportunity as taking for personal benefit opportunities
available resulting from a company position or privy to information, using
company property for personal gain, and competing with the company. 52 The
code
53
of ethics is to prohibit employees from taking such corporate opportunities.
H. NASDAQRules
Similar to the NYSE listing rules, the Nasdaq listing rules require a company
listed on its exchange adopt, disclose a code of ethics and any waivers. 54 It also
applies to directors, officers, and employees. 55 However, unlike the NYSE rules,
the Nasdaq rules require the code of ethics satisfy the requirements of the SEC's
section 406 regulation, and provide enforcement procedures. 56 The Nasdaq rules
41 Id. at 64,175.
46 NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.10, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,
http://www.nyse.com/lcm/1078416930909.html?enable=subsection&number-3&&sssnum (last visited
Sept. 22, 2007).
47 id.
48

Id.

49 Id.
50 Id.

"' NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.10, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,
http://www.nyse.com/Ilcm/1078416930909.html?enable=subsection&number=3&&sssnum (last visited
Sept. 22, 2007).
52

id.

53 Id.

54 Nasdaq
Corporate
Governance
Summary
of
Rule
Changes,
Nov.
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorpGovSummary.pdf (last visited September 22, 2007).
55 Id.
56 id.
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require the codes of conduct cover conflicts of interest and enforcement provisions
although it does not define the meaning of conflicts of interest and does not include
a prohibition against the taking of corporate opportunities. 57 It requires that only
the board or a committee may waive the requirements of a companies'
code of
58
conduct and any such waiver promptly disclosed to shareholders.
I.

The SEC's Role in Regulating SROs

The SEC's regulatory authority over listing a encies such as NYSE and
Nasdaq derives from section 19 of the Exchange Act.A Section 19(b)(1) gives the
SEC authority to approve proposed rules or amendments to rules by the NYSE and
Nasdaq. 6° The listing61 agencies must explain the purpose of and reasons for a
proposed rule change.
The62 SEC must hold rulemaking proceedings on SRO proposed rule
changes. The SRO may not implement rule changes unless approved by the
SEC.6 3 The SEC must then either approve the rule change or begin proceedings to
disapprove a rule change.64 The SEC must either approve or disapprove an SRO
proposed rule amendment based on its findings
that the proposed rule changes
5
SROs.
for
regulations
and
laws
applicable
meet
There is nothing in the statute that limits the scope of SRO rulemaking on
corporate governance. 66 Nonetheless, the SEC, in addition to its rulemaking

57 id.
58 id.

5' Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(2), (c) (2000); see Report,
Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standardsand CorporateGovernance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487,
1517-23 (2002); see also Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also S.
Rep. No. 94-75, at 7 (1975); see also Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance:
Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 969-72 (2003)
(discussing history of listing standards); see Douglas C. Michael, The Untenable Status of Corporate
Governance Listing Standards under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW. 1461, 1477, 1479
(1992); F. Hodge O'Neal, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565,
618-20 (1991) (discussing rulemaking authority of SEC over SROs); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate
Federalism in the Administrative State: The SEC's Discretion to Move the Line Between the State and
FederalRealms of Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143, 1151 (2007) (discussing
role of listing standards in corporate governance).
'0 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(l)(2), (c) (2000); see
American Bar Association, Report, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and
Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1496-1503 (2002) (discussing history of listing standards).
6 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (b)(2), (c); Douglas C. Michael,
Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards under The Securities Exchange Act, 47
Bus. LAW. 1461, 1463 (1992).
62 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(a)l(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (a)(1)(B) (2000).
63 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)l, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (b)(1) (2000).
64 Securities
65 Id.

and Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(a)1(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (a)(l)(B) (2000).

6 Id. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, "A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence Listing
Standards," UCLA School of Law, Research Paper No. 02-15, June 2002, http://ssm.com/
abstract=-317121 (last visited Sept. 23, 2007) (explaining that nothing prohibits SROs from making
rules on corporate governance); see American Bar Association, supra note 60, at 1519-21 (discussing
the role of listing standards in corporate governance); see also U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, http://www.sec.gov/rules/ concept/34-
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approval, maintains significant67 influence over SROs, and often uses this influence
to further its regulatory goals.
The SEC may also implement a proposed rule change if it believes such
action protects investors or otherwise maintains market integrity. 68 Once approved
the SRO may enforce its rules provided
such rules comply with applicable rules,
69
law.
state
and
federal
or
regulations
In the rulemaking record for the NYSE and Nasdaq standards on codes of
ethics, the SEC stated its belief that mandating adoption of a code of ethics would
not only encourage ethical behavior by directors, officers and employees, but also
encourage the knowledge and understanding of standards of conduct expected in
carrying out corporate duties. 70 It also stated its belief that the codes of ethic
requirements are consistent with Congressional intent to provide information to
shareholders on waivers, and otherwise consistent with requirements in furtherance
of the securities laws and regulations. 7 1 The rulemaking record does not suggest
the SEC commented that the NYSE or the 72Nasdaq rules intruded into the corporate
governance domain reserved for state law.
J.

The Interplay of SEC's section 406, NYSE, and Nasdaq Rules

Notwithstanding that the SEC's section 406 implementing regulation does
not require an issuer to adopt a code of ethics, any issuer that is also a registered
73
listed company with either the NYSE or Nasdaq must adopt a code of ethics.
Any NYSE or Nasdaq listed company risks de-listing for failing to comply with
listing agency rules. 74 The result is that many public companies must develop
50700.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). Section I Introduction and
Section I1Foundations of Self-Regulation describe the ability of SROs to go beyond SEC standards and
prescribe "business conduct." Id.
67 See Bainbridge, supra note 66, at n. 15; see American Bar Association, supra note 60, at 1503
(discussing the influence of the SEC on listing standards); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Federalism
in the Administrative State: The SEC's Discretion to Move the Line Between the State and Federal
Realms of Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143, 1178-79 (2007).
6' Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s b(l), (2) (2000).
69 Id; see American Bar Association, supra note 60, at 1517-23 (discussing regulatory authority of
SEC over listing agencies); see Michael, supra note 61, at 1496.
70 Self-Regulatory Organizations, 60 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,175 (Sec. and Exch. Comm'n Nov. 12,
2003) (order approving proposed rule changes).
71

id.

Id. Commentators did not raise the issue of SRO rules intruding into state corporate law. Id. See
also American Bar Association, supra note 60, at 1517-24.
73 See also JOHN T. BOSTELMAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESKBOOK, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE
Chapter 12, § 12:1.4 (Practising Law Institute 2004) (discussing interplay between section 406 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and NYSE/Nasdaq rules); see also Thomas 0. Gorman & Heather J. Stewart, Is
There a New Sheriff in Corporateville? The Obligations of Directors, Officers, Accountants, and
Lawyers after Sarbanes-Oxley of 2002, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 148 (2004) (discussing the impact of
not adopting a code of ethics); see generally Michael, supra note 61, at 1462-63, 1466-67.
74 NYSE
Listed
Company
Manual,
§
802.01
Continued
Listing
Criteria,
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyserefrhttp%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/i 1825081244
22.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcm_section.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007);
Nasdaq Listing
Requirements
for
Nasdaq
Securities
4300,
http://www.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/
display.html?rbid= 1705&element-id = 13 (last visited Sept. 23, 2007); see also BOSTELMAN, supra note
73, at § 12:1.4; Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State
72
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codes of ethics to satisfy SEC and listing agency rules or design varied codes of
ethics for different officers, directors, and employees. 75 Thus, the SEC has
required implicitly what it did not require directly./
K. Safe-Harborand Liability underSection 406
The SEC issued disclosure regulations for sections 406 and 407 under a
single release. 77 Section 407 regulations require the disclosure of whether a
company has a financial expert on its audit committee. 78 After receiving several
comments on the increased liability risks to directors designated as the financial
expert, the SEC concluded that it was not its intent to increase the obligations or
liabilities of the financial expert director because the purpose of the regulation was
disclosure. 79 Therefore, the SEC included a safe harbor from liability for the audit
committee financial expert resulting from the financial expert designation pursuant
expert
to the regulation. 8 The safe-harbor protects the audit committee financial
law.8 1
from increased duties, obligations, or liabilities under federal or state
The SEC did not include a similar safe harbor provision in section 406's
that both provisions are disclosure
code of ethics requirements, •notwithstanding
82
Further, there is nothing to suggest from the
and not substantive requirements.
SEC's rulemaking record that the SEC intended to alter the liability risks of senior
officers.83 Because the SEC did not address liability issues, or see the need to add
a safe-harbor to its section 406 regulation, the reasonable inference is that the SEC
views the code of ethics as disclosure obligations only. 84 This view is consistent
with the legislative history of SOX 406.
Though the SEC's implementation regulation does not directly address
liability issues, presumably, the SEC
• 85could prosecute for failure to disclose a code
of ethics (if adopted) or any waivers. What is not clear is whether the SEC could

Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 977-78 (2003).
75 See BOSTELMAN, supra note 73, at § 12:1.4.
76 See Thompson, supra note 67, at 1180-84 (2007); see A. C. Pritchard, Markets As Monitors: A
Proposalto Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities FraudEnforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925,
976, 1017 (1999); see Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Stephen
M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's DirectorIndependence Listing Standards, UCLA School of
Law, Research Paper No. 02-15, http://ssm.com/abstract-317121 (last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
77 Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg.
5110, 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 CFR pt. 228, 229, and 249).
78 Id.

7' Id. at 5117.

goId. at 5116-17.
81 Id.
82 See

Disclosure Required By Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed.
Reg. 5110, 5118-19 (Jan. 31, 2003); see Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory
Disclosure,and the Marketfor Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 280-281 (2005).
83 See Newberg, supra note 82, at 278-79.
'4 See id.
85 See Paul Vizcarrondo, Jr. & Andrew C. Houston, Liabilities Under Sections 11, 12, 15 and 17 of
the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1556
PLlI/Corp 537, 542 (2006). "Sarbanes-Oxley provides that any violation of the Act is considered a
violation of the 1934 Act, thus availing the SEC of its full range of powers, remedies and penalties
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prosecute an improper waiver of the code of ethics by the board under federal
securities laws or whether a board could claim compliance with state fiduciary
duties as its defense for a code of ethics waiver. 86 Therefore, it is likely state
fiduciary laws continue to govern liability of officers and directors subject to the
code of ethics, and that any underlying behavior not in compliance
with a code of
87
ethics are not subject to federal securities law violations.
If, as Congress suggests, investors must decide the value and meaning of
codes of ethics, then, shareholders can use knowledge on waivers of codes of
ethics to demand greater accountability by boards. However, if the triad of codes
of ethics laws, regulations, and rules further the encroachment into state corporate
law in areas clearly reserved for the state; then the codes of ethics requirements
true value may be to continue federalization of state corporate law. 88 Whether it is
a race to the top or a race to the bottom, shareholders benefit from a balanced
symbiotic relationship between federal securities laws, listing standards, and state
corporate law. 89 Defining the fiduciary duties of officers and directors in state
corporate law90 is a fundamental principle of the internal affairs doctrine worthy of
preservation.

under the 1934 Act. It also expands the 1934 Act remedies by providing that, in civil enforcement
actions brought by the SEC, courts may grant any equitable relief that is appropriate for protection of
investors, which could suggest broader and more intrusive court oversight of (and monetary remedies
against) violators of the Act. Except with respect to recovery of profits from prohibited sales during a
blackout period and suits by 'whistleblowers,' the Act does not expressly create new private rights of
action for civil liability for violations of Sarbanes-Oxlcy itself. However, the Act potentially impacts
existing private rights of action under the 1934 Act by (1)lengthening the general statute of limitations
applicable to private securities fraud actions to the earlier of two years after discovery of the facts
constituting the violation or five years after the violation ...and (2) expanding reporting and disclosure
requirements, which could potentially expand the range of actions that can be alleged to give rise to
private suits under Sections 10(b) and 18 of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule lOb-5." Id. (internal citation
omitted).
86 Id.

id.
88Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1577-78, 1617 (2005); Steven A. Ramirez, The End of CorporateGovernance
Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structuresfor a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 326-27 (2007);
see Pritchard, supra note 76, at 927-30, 976-81 (1999); see Michael, supra note 61, at 1478 (1992);
Robert B. Thompson, supra note 67, at 1181-82 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and
Resurrectionof SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 591 (1991).
89Kahan & Rock, supra note 88, at 1619-22; see Ramirez, supra note 88, at 313, 329, 339; Robert
B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal
Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 963 (2003); see American Bar Association, supra note 60,
at 1487, 1522-23 (2002).
90See supra note 89; William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of
Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 633-39 (2006); see Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The DesirableLimits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1484, 1499-1507 (1992); Bainbridge, supra note 88, at 565, 619 (discussing
history of SEC's role in federalizing corporate law); see generally Paul Rose, The Corporate
Governance Industry, 32 J.COR. L. 887 (2007).
87
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WHERE IS THE LINE?

InternalAffairs Doctrine

The settled accord between federal and state regulation of corporate law 91
is
that federal securities law regulates disclosure and state law regulates conduct.
Although Congress is free to create federal law that overrides state corporate law,
absent direct Congressional action or legislative intent, courts will not usurp the
role of state law in decipherment of those matters reserved for it.92 Thus, the
internal affairs doctrine simpVy provides that state law govern the internal affairs of
the state created corporation. The Delaware Supreme Court has succinctly stated
that under the doctrine of internal affairs state law governs those matters "that
pertain to the relationships among or between the corporation and its officers,
directors, and shareholders." 94
Notwithstanding the federal and state law demarcation, the separation is not
always a bright line. 95 Federal securities laws have encroached state law in areas
other than disclosure such as voting rights and insider trading. 96 Specifically,
insider trader laws, which regulate conduct is an appropriate intrusion into state
law justified by the need to ensure the integrity of the trading markets. 97 Although
9' CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Amer., 481 U.S. 69, 85-87 (1987) , rev'd in part, 481 U.S. 69
(1987) (addressing constitutional challenges to Indiana's Control Share Acquisitions statute. Six days
after the Indiana Act took effect, the Dynamics Corporation of America announced a tender offer for
greater than a million shares of CTS stock. The Court considered whether the Williams Act had
preempted the Indiana Act and whether the Indiana Act violated the Commerce Clause. The Court
found no preemption and stated that "if Congress had intended to pre-empt all state laws that delay the
acquisition of voting control following a tender offer, it would have said so explicitly.'"); see also E.
Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in CorporateGovernance and the ProfessionalResponsibilities
ofAdvisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441,443-44 (2003).
92 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 88, at 1577-78, 1617; Richard A. Booth, The Emerging Conflict
between Federal Securities Law and State Corporation Law, 12 J. CORP. L. 73 (1986); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, supra note 90, at 1437; Lucian A. Bebchuk. & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law:
Lessons from History, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1793 (2006); see generally William W. Bratton & Joseph
A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619
(2006); Renee Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance
Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 880 (2006); see generally Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the
Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 Bus. LAW. 317 (2007);
Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2521 (2005).
93 See Vantage Vent. Partners v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005); see also CTS Corp., 481
U.S. at 69; Alan R. Palmiter, The CTS Gambit: Stanching the Federalizationof Corporate Law, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 445,451 (1991).
94 Vantage Vent. Partners,871 A.2d at 1113; see also CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 69; see Palmiter,
supra note 93, at 45 1; William L. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L. J. 663, 665-66 (1974).
95 See Jones, supra note 92 at 879, 883 (discussing the circularity of the internal affairs doctrine);
see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrectionof SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565,
619 (1991) (discussing the role of federal and state law in regulation of corporations).
96 See Jones, supra note 92, at 882.
97 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977). The internal affairs doctrine states
that state law governs those matters concerning the internal workings of the corporation. Id. In a case
involving violations of federal securities laws for insider trading, the Supreme Court concluded that
breach of a fiduciary duty under state law is not a breach of securities laws. Id. at 476. The Supreme
Court stated that the purpose of securities laws was disclosure and that issues of fairness were not
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a debate continues over the scope of state law in the regulation of securities, the
regulation of the conduct,
including the fiduciary duties, of directors and officers
98
remains a state matter.
B. InternalAffairs and the SEC
In cases where the SEC implemented rules that encroached into states' rights
to regulate corporate governance matters, courts have intervened to vacate such
rules. 99 In Business Roundtable v. SEC, the D.C. circuit struck down a SEC
regulation barring national listing associations from listing stock of a corporation
restricting or reducing its per share voting rights. 00 The court described the SEC's
regulation as crossing the line "beyond disclosure." 101 The court concluded that
the regulatory review of the SEC over SROs does not give it the authority to create
federal corporate laws using "access to ...capital markets as its enforcement
mechanism."102 The court concluded that unless SRO rules0 3further the exercise of
federal regulatory power, they could not preempt state law.1
C. FederalCommon Law and The Banking Crisis
During the banking crisis of the 1980's, tensions arose between the role of
matters of direct concern to the securities laws. Id. at 477. The Supreme Court affirmed prior decisions
that a state's interest in developing consistent rules for directors, officers, and shareholders is
fundamental to the commerce clause. Id. "[T]he 'fundamental purpose' of the Act [the securities act]
as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure'; once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the
fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute." Id. at 478.
98See generally Steven A. Ramirez, supra note 88, at 303; see generally Peter Ferola, The Role of
Audit Committee in the Wake of Corporate Federalism: Sarbanes-Oxley's Creep into State Corporate
Law, 71 J. Bus. & SEC L. 143 (2007); David J. Schulte, 13 J. CORP. L. 535 (1988); see Gorman &
Stewart, supra note 73, at 140-41, 149-50, 173-74; see generally Veasey, supra note 91, at 441; see
generally Robert Ahdieh, From Federalization to Mixed Governance in Corporate Law: A Defense of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 722, 731 (2005) (arguing that modem public corporations face
dual pressures from privatization on one hand and nationalization on the other but that these pressures
may open opportunities to develop and reform corporate law. It is not disputed that federal law has a
"traditional orientation" to regulate securities issuances, disclosure, and secondary trading while state
law has been traditionally oriented to corporate governance, but tradition alone is insufficient to
challenge the Act's corporate governance mandates.
A doctrinal segregation opens up two
perspectives. One is to characterize corporate law as private and securities law as public and the other
isto characterize corporate law as the "regulation of substance" while securities law is the regulation of
process).
99Bus. Roundtable v. SEC., 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting the court in C.T.S. Corp.,
a case involving control shares, the Williams Act, and the Commerce Clause). On review of an order
by the SEC, the Court stated that "[n]o principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly
established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define
the voting rights of shareholders." 481 U.S. at 89. "A State has an interest in promoting stable
relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that investors
in such corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs." Id. at 91; see Michael, supra note 88,
at 1480-85 (analyzing the Business Roundtable opinion).
'00 Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407; American Bar Association, Report, Special Study on Market
Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1525 (2002).
'0' Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412.
102 Id.
'03 Id. at 413-417; see Bainbridge, supra note 95, at 618-20 (discussing rulemaking authority of
SEC over SROs); see American Bar Association, supra note 100, 1523-24.
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federal and state law in regulating the conduct of officers./°4 In a series of cases,
the Supreme Court resolved several key issues10on
the role of federal and state law
5
in determining the liability of banking officers.
In an environment much like the crisis that led to the passage of the SOX
Act, Congress passed in response to the scandals involving financial institutions, a
series of laws to protect the banking industry from fraud and abuse, and to reign in
conduct of banking officers./°6 The majority of the scandals involved senior
officers and directors of failed financial institutions
accused of fraud, improper
07
conduct, and breach of various fiduciary duties.1
Many of the failed financial institutions were state-chartered financial
institutions; however, state-chartered financial institutions insured by the Federal
Depository
Corporation ("FDIC") are subject to federal regulatory
• . Insurance
108
requirements.
The more significant of these regulatory requirements is the
ability of the FDIC (or appropriate regulatory receiver) to0 9sue officers and directors
of failed state chartered institutions for breach of duties.
In 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"). I 10The purpose of FIRREA was to allow the FDIC
to recover depositors' losses from a failed state-chartered financial institution
above a certain threshold. I I As a result, FIRREA governed
the liability of
112
directors and officers of FDIC insured financial institutions.
Specifically, section 1821 (k) of FIRREA required that "a director and officer
of insured depository institutions may be personally liable.., for gross negligence,
including.., conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than
gross negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined
and determined under applicable State law." 113 Before passage of FIRREA, case
1 14
law on the liability of financial institution's officers and directors was not clear.
The purpose of section 1821(k) was to clarify
the liability of directors and officers
15
of state-chartered financial institutions.
During the course of financial institutions bankruptcy litigation, confusion
1' See Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(K): CongressionalSubsidizing of
Negligent Bank Directors and Officers?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 625 (1996).
" See id. at 625-26.

Id. at 626-36.
See generally id.
108See id.
'06
'07

109Ramirez, supra note 104, at 661, 665-66.
"1 Id.at626.
. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (2000).
112 id.
Id.
See Ramirez, supra note 104, at 631. See, e.g. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447
(1942) (applying federal common law to a state-chartered bank but distinguishing Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637 (1938)); see FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424 (7th Cir.
1993) (applying federal common law to state-chartered bank); but see RTC v. Gregor, 872 F. Supp.
1140, 1144-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that state law governs claims against directors and officers of
federally-chartered banks and that federal common law does not even apply to federally-chartered
banks).
11 Id.
113
14
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arose primarily from several circuit court opinions reaching opposite results as to
whether directors and officers owed federal common law duties or state common
law duties.11 6 The two issues developed from a lack of clarity in lower court
opinions on whether state or federal law governed officer's knowledge of fraud
and whether there is a federal common law providing standard of care for officers
and directors. 117 The Supreme Court addressed these and 11other
issues in two key
8
cases: 0 'Melveny & Myers v. FDICand Atherton v. FDIC.
Relying on established principles, the Supreme Court in 0'Melveny held that
state law governs the status of a corporate officer's knowledge on state law claims
for a state chartered bank. 1 9 Answering the questions of whether federal or state
law governed, the Supreme Court held absent an explicit federal statutory
provision,120issues not addressed in federal regulations are presumably subject to
state law.

Subsequently, in Atherton, relying in part on O'Melveny, the Court,
interpreting section 1821(k) of FIRREA, concluded that the senior officers of a
failed state chartered financial institution are subject to state law. 121 It further
116

Id. at 631,635.

...Id. at 625.
18 O'Melvney & Meyers v. Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79 (1994). FDIC sued the former
counsel of a failed state chartered financial institution. Id. at 82. The issue was whether state law or
federal law governed the tort liability of the attorneys who provided legal counsel to the failed financial
institution, but who were not officers of the financial institution. Id. at 85. Relying on the principles of
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Court held that state law governed the conduct of the attorneys and
concluded that there was no federal common law. Id. at 83-84. The court went on to suggest that
unless there is an explicit federal statutory provision or regulation that is comprehensive and detailed,
state law would govern matters not otherwise addressed by a federal regulatory scheme. Id. at 85. The
Court reiterates that there are limited circumstances where it is likely to find a federal common law and
these exist when there is a "conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law."
Id. at 87 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) and Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). Indeed, finding a conflict between federal and state law is essential in
finding a federal common law. OMelveny, 512 U.S. at 87-88. In assessing whether there is a
conflicting policy that court looks to interest in uniformity of laws, a direct right of the government tied
to an identifiable federal policy. Id. at 88-89; see also Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S.
213 (1997).
"9 O'Melvney, 512 U.S. at 89 (concluding that officers of a federally insured state-chartered
financial institution accused of fraud and breaches of fiduciary duties under California law were subject
to state law).
120 Id. at 85 (the Court "would not contradict an explicit federal statutory provision. Nor... adopt
a court-made rule to supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed; matters
left unaddressed in such a scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state
law.").
21 Atherton, 519 U.S. at 216. The FDIC (successor to the RTC) sued officers and directors of a
failed federally chartered financial institution. Id. The issues in the case were whether the standard of
care for the officers' conduct was governed by state law, federal common law or a special federal
statute. Id. at 215-16. The Court held that "state law sets the standard of conduct as long as the state
standard (such as simple negligence) is stricter than that of the federal statute. The federal statute
nonetheless sets a 'gross negligence' floor, which applies as a substitute for state standards that are
more relaxed." Id. at 216. Where Congress speaks, the intent must follow. Id. The Court, again
relying on Erie, confirmed that there is no federal common law and the justification for federal common
law is for limited circumstances. Id. at 218. In deciding whether the application of state law standards
of care conflict with a federal policy or interest, the Court concluded that uniformity was not a
persuasive argument because banks were permitted to follow the corporate governance of states and
that state-chartered banks were indeed governed by state law. Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519
U.S. 213, 218 (1997).
In deciding whether federal statutory law supplanted state law, the court
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concluded that there is no federal common law absent a "specific showing that the
use of state law will
create a significant conflict with, or threat to, some federal
' 122
policy or interest."
D. SOX and FederalInterest
The legislative history of SOX section 406 suggests that federal interests are
in the disclosure of ethical standards and waivers123 The SEC's regulatory
implementation of section 406 also focuses on knowledge of ethical standards and
disclosure.' 24 The SEC's failure to use its rulemaking authority or political
influence to limit the NYSE and Nasdaq corporate governance rules so that they
were consistent with the internal affairs doctrine contravenes the legislative intent
regarding code of ethics disclosures and the SEC's regulatory authority.125
Further, the SEC did not demonstrate a threat to a federal policy or interest to
warrant the supplanting of state fiduciary principles governing officer and director
conduct in its rulemaking approval of NYSE and Nasdaq rule amendments. 26 The
court in Business Roundtable rejected the SEC's argument that integrity of the
markets was a sufficient justification to intrude into a state's right to regulate
internal corporate matters.
Such an intrusion into state corporate law is difficult
to justify under SRO rulemaking
when compliance with state law is also a standard
28
rules.'
agency
listing
for

IV.

DELAWARE STATE LAW

A. Corporate Opportunityand Conflicts of Interest
Corporate opportunity and conflicts of interest are common law principles
that describe the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by corporate agents to
interpreted that FIRREA supplanted lower standards. Id.
122 Id. at 214; see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate
Code of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 27981 (finding no federal common law on the standard of care under FIRREA).
123See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies:
Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107"h Cong. (2002) (statement
of Honorable David S. Ruder, former Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n) (stating the internal
affairs of the corporation are not subject to SEC direct intervention); see also Joshua A. Newberg,
Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market For Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L.
REV. 253, 272-76 (2005) (discussing legislative history of SOX section 406).
124See supranotes 2, 18, 29, 31.
125 See Bainbridge, supra note 95, at 595-98 (discussing SEC oversight over SROs).
126

id.

127Id;see Michael, supra note 61, at 1462-63, 1483-84; see also Bus. Roundtable,at 408-09; see
also S. REP. No. 94-75, at 7 (1975); see American Bar Association, supra note 100, at 1491-92, 152526.
128See Bainbridge, supra note 95, at 595-98; see Michael, supra note 61, at 1493-94; see also Bus.
Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 408-09; see also S. REP. No. 94-75, at 7 (1975); see American Bar Association,
supra note 100, at 1518-19.
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shareholders. 129 Directors and officers owe duties of loyalty that prohibit putting
personal interests above those of the corporation and shareholders. 13 Corporate
opportunity doctrine issues occur when the corporate officer or director takes an
opportunity that results in a conflict between the officers or directors fiduciary
obligations to the corporation and personal interests.131
B.

Conflicts of Interest in Delaware

Delaware has codified parts of its conflict of interest rules in its interested
director statute.132 The statute does not void transactions deemed conflicts of
interest, but allows for disclosure of material information and voting by
disinterested directors.1 33 The statute relies on fairness and good faith as standards
for assessing the validity of an interested director or officer's transaction with the
corporation.
C. CorporateOpportunityin Delaware
Unlike conflict of interest rules, Delaware's corporate opportunity doctrine
derives from common law principles expounded in Guth v. Loft, Inc. 135 In Guth,
the court stated corporate opportunity derives from basic fiduciary duties owed by
corporate officers and directors, and requires protection of corporate interests
above personal.136 Broadly defined, the corporate opportunity doctrine prohibits an
officer or director from taking advantage of a business opportunity if the
corporation is financially able to take the opportunity. 137 However, the business
opportunity must be consistent with the corporation's business, the corporation
must have an "interest or expectancy" in the business opportunity, and if taken, the
opportunity puts the officer or director in conflict with the duties owed to the
corporation.

Notwithstanding this test, an officer or director may take a corporate
opportunity if the business opportunity does not become available due to the
officer's or director's corporate role, the opportunity is not "essential" to the
corporation, the corporation does not have an "interest or expectancy," and the
opportunity did not result from wrongfully using corporate resources.

129 Cede

& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361-62 (Del. 1993).

130 id.

13' Broz
132

v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 157 (Del. 1996); Cede, 634 A.2d at 361-62.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2007); see Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221-22

(Del. 1976).
133 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (West 2007); see Cede, 634 A.2d at 365-66, n. 33, 34.
'34 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (West 2007); see Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404
(Del. 1987).
" See Broz, 673 A.2d at 154-55 (stating that the corporate opportunity doctrine is derived from
Guth); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (Del. Ch. 1939).
136 Guth, 5 A.2d at 510-11; see Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 923 (Del. 1956).

,

Broz, 673 A.2d at 157.
Id. at 155.
139See id.
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In determining whether the corporation has an "interest or expectancy" in the
business opportunity, the courts have stated there must be reasonable basis to find
a connection between the opportunity and the corporation's business. 40 Assessing
the meaning of "interest or expectancy" includes a determination of whether a
company's financial position allows it the reasonable opportunity consistent with
its overall "aspirations" for the business. 41 No single factor determines when a
corporate opportunity exists, and issues of fairness are central to the analysis. 142
If there is a business opportunity, in which the corporation does not have an
"interest or expectancy," the officer or director may take the opportunity for him or
herself.' 43 Under Delaware law, the officer, or director, is not obligated to ask the
board for formal permission to take the business opportunity provided there is a
reasonable basis
to believe the corporation does not have an interest in the
44
opportunity. 1
D. Listing Agency Rules and Delaware'sCorporateOpportunity
Doctrine/Conflictof Interest
The Nasdaq rules on code of ethics require only that the code of ethics
covers conflicts of interest and otherwise complies with SEC's section 406
requirements.1 45
The rule does not include a prohibition on corporate
opportunity. 146 As a result, Nasdaq's code of ethics rules does not include a
detailed definition of code conduct that differs from state fiduciary duties.
The corporate opportunity doctrine in Delaware law and the NYSE's
definition of corporate opportunity differ in significant ways. Under the NYSE
rules, a company's code of ethics must prohibit employees, officers, and directors
from taking corporate opportunities. 14 Under Delaware law, officers and directors
may take a corporate opportunity, even without formal approval by the board, if
there is reasonable determination that the corporation is unable to take the

140

See id. at 156 (citing Johnston v. Greene 121 A.2d 919 (Del. 1956)). See also DEL. CORP. LAWS

tit. 8, § 122(17) (allowing a corporation to renounce in its certificate of incorporation or by board action
any interest or expectancy of the corporation in a business opportunity).
' See id. at 157.
Broz, 673 A.2d at 155; See also Hollinger Int'l v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1061-62 (Del. Ch.

142

2004).
141 Broz, 673 A.2d at 155; Hollinger,844 A.2d at 1061-62.
144 Broz, 673 A.2d at 157 (stating "[i]t is not the law of Delaware that presentation to the board is a
necessary prerequisite to a finding that a corporate opportunity has not been usurped."). See also id. at

158 (distinguishing Yiannatsis v. Stephanis, 653 A.2d 275, 278-79, 282 (Del. 1995) relied on by lower
court). In Yiannatsis, a shareholder brought suit against other shareholders and the corporation for
acquiring shares from the estate of a deceased shareholder in breach of the shareholder's agreement. Id.

The Delaware Court of Chancery found that the defendant shareholder breached the fiduciary duty of
loyalty by taking a corporate opportunity in its own self-interest without properly presenting the
opportunity to the plaintiff. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the decision on the
same grounds, failure to present the opportunity to purchase the shares to the plaintiff. Id; see also
MBCA §8.70.
141 See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
146

Id.

ld; see also Self-Regulatory Organizations, 60 Fed. Reg. 64, 154 (Nov. 12, 2003) (order
approving proposed rule changes).
147
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opportunity. 48 The board need not formally review the opportunity and decide to
reject it before the officer or director takes the opportunity.
The NYSE rules differ significantly from Delaware's fiduciary duty
obligations of the officer or director.150 The result is that Delaware-incorporated
NYSE-listed companies must prohibit the taking of corporate opportunities in its
code of ethics, formally obtain board approval for any waivers, and disclose such
waivers to investors. Such companies must develop codes of ethics that satisfy
listing agency rules, which require compliance otherwise not required under
Delaware's fiduciary laws.

V.

A.

IN SUPPORT OF A SAFE-HARBOR

CorporateGovernance and SRO rules

The court in Business Roundtable defined boundaries for the SEC.' 51 The
SEC could not compel SRO rulemaking that was outside of its statutory
authority. 152 The SEC did not compel standards for SRO code of ethics
rulemaking; rather they approved standards that crossed into corporate governance
area reserved for state corporate law.153 The SEC has tacitly done what the court in
Business Roundtable suggested it could not do- create a federal law using the
capital markets as its enforcement arm. 54
Although section 19 of the Exchange Act does not exclude corporate
governance from the scope of SRO rulemaking standards, the Business Roundtable
decision certainly suggests that SEC review of SRO rules must be consistent with
the purposes of the Exchange Act.' 55 Thus, if the SEC cannot mandate SRO rules
to create federal corporate law, then it should be able to approve self-generated
SRO rules to accomplish the same goal. 156 Even if this is what the SEC has
accomplished through its approval of SRO code of ethics requirements, the SEC

14' Broz, 673 A.2d at 157-58; Yiannatsis, 653 A.2d at 278-79, 282.
149 Broz, 673 A.2d at 157-58; Yiannatsis, 653 A.2d at 278-79, 282.
150See E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the Professional

Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 448-49 (2003) (discussing the ways SRO and SOX
intrude into or supplant state internal affairs doctrine).
'5' Bus. Roundtable v. SEC., 905 F.2d 406, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see generally Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrectionof SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565 (1991); Robert
B. Thompson, Corporate Federalism in the Administrative State: The SEC's Discretion to Move the
Line Between the State and FederalRealms of Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143,

1181-82 (2007) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 19(b)(c), 15 USC §78s(b)(2),(c).
152See Thompson, supra note 151, at 1182-83.
153 Id.
'4 Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412; see also Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 619-20 (discussing
the risk of creating federal law to regulate corporate governance).
155 Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412; see also Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 619-20; American Bar
Association, Special Study on Market Structure. Listing Standards and CorporateGovernance, 57 Bus.
LAW. 1487, 1521-22 (2002);Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 19(b)(c), 15 USC §78s(b)(2),(c).
156See American Bar Association, supra note 154, at 1526; see Thompson, supra note 15 1, at 1181.
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has not established
a conflict with federal law warranting an intrusion into state
157
law matters.
Other intrusions into state corporate law by listing agency rules, such as
independent director requirements or shareholder voting, are less intrusive than a
direct redefining of state fiduciary obligations. 58 The NYSE rules on corporate
opportunity and conflicts of interest are the "proverbial camel's nose" moving into
state corporate governance - defining fiduciary duties - in a way that not only
further federalizes corporate law. 59 As companies face litigation challenges on
their compliance with the SEC's 406 regulation, issues surrounding the
appropriateness of waivers are likely to arise.160
B.

Reasonsfor a Safe-Harbor

A safe-harbor provision in the SEC's 406 regulation would serve several
important functions. It would directly acknowledge that 406 is primarily a
disclosure requirement as suggested by rulemaking record of SOX and the SEC. It
would also give the SEC a way out of its dilemma of approving SRO rules not only
inconsistent 161
with the legislative history, but that tacitly intrude into state corporate
governance.
Because it is unknown how SRO rules that intrude into state corporate law
may be enforced, a safe-harbor provision would also minimize the securities
litigation risks to companies. 62 For example, NYSE and Nasdaq rules go beyond
the scope of SOX and SEC regulations in several ways. 163 SOX limited its
application to principal senior financial officers. 64 Although the SEC expanded its
application to include the principal executive officer, it did not include directors.
t 65
Both NYSE and Nasdaq include directors within its rules for code of ethics.
151 See Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 214 (1997); see also Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see Newberg, supra note 122, at 279-81; see Thompson, supra note 151, at 1183.
158 See Thompson, supra note 151, at 1163-68 (discussing other SRO rules impacting state

corporate law).
159 Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 620 (describing rule 19c-4 as the "proverbial camel's nose").
160 Thompson, supra note 151, at 1185-87 (discussing litigation risks); see NYSE Listed Company
Manual
§
303A.29,
Code
of
Business
Conduct
and
Ethics,
htp://www.nyse.com/Icm1078416930909.html?enable=subsection&number=3&&sssnum (last visited
Sept. 22, 2007).
161 Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 620 (describing the creeping federalization of SRO rules); see
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.26,34, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,
http://www.nyse.com/lcm/I078416930909.html?enable=subsection&number-3&&sssnum (last visited
Sept. 22, 2007).
162 See Thompson, supra note 151, at 1187 (discussing enforcement issues).
163 See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.44, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,
http://www.nyse.com/Icm/1078416930909.html?enable=subsection&number=3&&sssnum (last visited
Sept. 22, 2007).
1'4 See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.17, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,
http://www.nyse.comlcmi1078416930909.html?enable=subsection&number-=3&&sssnum (last visited
Sept. 22, 2007).
165 However, SEC's 406 regulation does not apply to directors, but it implicitly requires director
approval of waivers to codes of ethics, supra note 33; see NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.46,
Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,
http://www.nyse.com/lcm/1078416930909.html?enable=subsection&number=3&&sssnum (last visited
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SEC regulations contemplate that companies may have several codes of ethics for
different officers. 166 Section 19 does not limit SROs to a scope of coverage in
circumstances where it differs from the SEC. 16 7 Litigation issues of enforcement,
and liability68 and how listing agencies rules impact compliance issues are
unknowns. 1
More critically, the NYSE rule in particular, by requiring codes of ethics to
prohibit corporate opportunities and conflicts of interest has developed rules
contrary to at least the state law of Delaware. 169 What are the litigation risks to
companies? The impact on interpretation of state fiduciary duties is likely to result
in considerable confusion as companies attempt to comply with listing agency
rules that regulate officer70conduct and, as one commentator argues, defacto federal
preemption of state law.'
C. A New Federalism
The establishment of listing agency rules as a new federalism of corporate
law is a particularly dangerous slippery slope.' 17 As previously indicated, the
legislative history of section 406 of the SOX Act does not suggest that Congress
intended the code of ethics disclosure to be anything more than a disclosure 1of
72
whether a company had a code of ethics, if not why not, and any waivers.
Although inclusion of a code of ethics requirement seems to be Congress' response
to the public outcry over corporate misconduct, the SOX Act requires only
disclosure and leaves the decision of whether such conduct requires further
investigation to investors. 173 The SEC's authority to approve listing agency rules
Sept. 22, 2007), seeNasdaq Corporate Governance Summary of Rule Changes, Nov. 2003,
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorpGovSummary.pdf (last visited September 22, 2007)
166See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.29, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,
http://www.nyse.com/lcm/1078416930909.html?enable=subsection&number-3&&sssnum (last visited
Sept. 22, 2007).
167See Bainbridge, supra note 66 (explaining that nothing prohibits SROs from making rules on
corporate governance); see also American Bar Association, supra note 60, at 1519-21 (discussing the
role of listing standards in corporate governance); see also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-50700.htm (last
visited September 23, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). Sections I and II of the Concept Release
Concerning Self Regulation describe the ability of SROs to go beyond SEC standards and prescribe
"business conduct." Id.
168See Thompson, supra note 151, at 1185-86.
169Given the vast number of public corporations incorporated in Delaware the impact is significant.
170 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence Listing Standards,
UCLA School of Law, Research Paper No. 02-15, 29, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=317121
(last visited Sept. 17, 2007).
'71 See Thompson, supra note 151, at 1185-86; see Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 619-20;
Lyman
P. Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1149, 1216-17 (2004) (describing SOX and SRO imposition of responsibilities on directors and
implications on fiduciary duties).
172See Ruder, supra note 124 (stating that the internal affairs of the corporation are not subject to
SEC direct intervention); see also Newberg, supra note 123, at 272-76 (discussing legislative history of
SOX section 406); Id.at 26..
173See James H Check, et. al., Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, March 31, 2003, p.69, for a discussion on the way a committee can comply with state
fiduciary rules, http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf (last visited Sept.
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does not include the authority to intrude into those matters left to state law. 17 4 Nor
does it include the ability to create 1federal
corporate law without demonstrating a
75
threat to federal policy in state law.
Quasi-federal rules, which use capital markets as enforcement mechanisms
also put public companies in a difficult compliance situation. Thus, there is the
need to clarify what rules govern senior officers' conduct in meeting the standards
under the corporate opportunity doctrine as defined under the NYSE rules and state
fiduciary duties. The SEC acknowledged the risks to directors under section 407
and included a safe-harbor provision to minimize the risks to the audit committee
financial expert. 176 It should also do the same for principal financial and executive
officers under section 406.
The SEC has stated that because of the listing agency requirements to adopt
a code of ethics, public companies whose stock lists on the NYSE or Nasdaq must
develop codes of ethics or risk de-listing.177 Without a safe harbor, companies risk
defining senior officer conduct for
compliance with codes of ethics in ways that
178
are not consistent with state law.
The safe harbor provision is necessary to further the disclosure function of
section 406 and not conduct.179 The disclosure versus conduct accord serves as the
appropriate boundary for demarcating between federal securities S180
laws and state law
in defining the duties of senior officers of the public corporation.
Additionally,
a safe harbor clarifies that state law governs fiduciary duties of officers including
the meaning of conflicts of interest and corporate opportunities.
VI. CONCLUSION

SRO rules should not replace state law, the SEC or private attorneys in
enforcing the obligations of directors and officers.1 81 Many debate the efficacy of
code of ethics laws and regulations. It is unlikely company adoption of codes of

29, 2007).
...Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,412 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
'75 See Thompson, supra note 151, at 619-20.
176 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (2006).
177NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 802.01 Continued Listing Criteria, available at:
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=-http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/ 1825081244
22.html&displayPage=/cmlcmsection.htm
(last visited Sept. 23, 2007);
Nasdaq Listing
Requirements for Nasdaq Securities 4300, available at
http://www.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=l 705&elementid= 13 (last visited Sept.
23, 2007); see also BOSTELMAN, supra note 73, at § 12:1.4; Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative
Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 961,977-78 (2003).
178 The regulations do not define the meaning of "honest and ethical conduct" nor does it define the
basis of liability for satisfying the requirements of the code of ethics. Supra, note 33 Further, there is
nothing in the legislative history to suggest the purpose of the code of ethics provisions was to define
standards of conduct of principal financial officers. Supra note 33.
'79 See Veasey, supra note 2, at 443-44; see also American Bar Association, supra note 6, at 149396.
IgoBratton et al, supra note 90 at 633-39.
...See A. C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges

as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 980 (1999).
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ethics will result in less corporate malfeasance; however, the use of corporate
codes of ethics to set benchmarks for minimal corporate conduct can have positive
benefits. Nonetheless, corporate law has reserved for the states the responsibility
for defining the boundary for officers and directors' behavior. 182 Until such time
Congress dictates a need to define corporate conduct, the SEC must not use its
authority over listing agencies to embolden federal law. There is nothing to
suggest it was the inadequacy of state law in defining fiduciary duties, which
caused the recent round of corporate malfeasance.
The proposal in this article recommends the SEC protect investors by adding
a safe-harbor provision that clarifies the purpose of section 406, because SRO rules
not only go beyond the legislative intent, but also re-define the state fiduciary
duties of officers (and directors) in a way inconsistent with minimally Delaware's
law. It also calls for the SEC to comply with the spirit and intent of Business
Roundtable by not using listing agency rules to do indirectly what it cannot do
directly - intrude into those matters that relate to the relationships among and
between the corporation and its officers, directors and shareholders.

182 See Roberta Romano,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1597-1600 (2005).

